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Julia Kristeva and the Politics of Life 
Sarah K. Hansen 
Drexel University 
Introduction: The Mute Symptoms of Contemporary Politics 
In her well-known early trilogy—Powers of Horror (1980), Tales of Love 
(1983), and Black Sun (1987)—Julia Kristeva describes melancholia as a 
suffering subjectivity characterized by “the intolerance for object loss” and 
“the signifier’s failure.”1 Unable to lose and symbolically compensate for the 
archaic maternal Thing, melancholics suffer from “symbolic collapse”—a 
slowing down of linguistic activity and a feeling of meaninglessness and 
despair. To illustrate, Kristeva draws on several case studies from her own 
clinical practice. For one analysand, Helen, depressive episodes are like a 
mute living death: “I find myself glued to the spot, as if paralyzed, I lose the 
ability to speak, my mouth fills with chalk, my mind completely empty. [It 
is] as if I were dead but I do not think of killing myself, nor do I desire to do 
so, it is as if it had already been done.”2 For another analysand, Isabel, 
pregnancy exacerbates the quiet suffering. Isabel “gives birth for death’s 
sake,” entering the life of motherhood in order to exit her own. Her 
daughter is a “parenthesis within the depression,” a “new speech inhibitor 
in [Isabel’s] already not-so-talkative world.”3  According to Kristeva, a crisis 
in symbolic law precipitates the quiet failures of Helen and Isabel. A wider 
notion than civil or criminal law, the psychoanalytic concept of symbolic law 
refers to the form-giving function of social structures and institutions 
including language itself; symbolic law supports bodily experiences and 
semiotic drives in meaningful signifying systems.4 Today, loving forms of 
social support are rare; as bodies silently suffer the disconnection from form-
giving law, law itself “suffers” the disconnection of drives and affects.  
Kristeva’s account of symbolic crisis vis-à-vis melancholia bears a 
striking resemblance to Giorgio Agamben’s account of the “sovereign ban.” 
In Homo Sacer, Agamben describes the ban as an empty law “in force 
without significance”; the one who has been banned “is not simply set 
outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned to it, 
exposed and threatened” at an ambiguous threshold.5 In the fracture 
between drives and words, the melancholic body is, like the biopolitical 
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body, vulnerably “abandoned to law and remitted to itself.”6 It is a life 
“burdened with emptiness,” a “flimsy defense” against law’s “fierce but 
artificial” tyranny.7  These resonances deepen in Kristeva’s more recent three 
volume series on the “powers and limits of psychoanalysis”—The Sense and 
Nonsense of Revolt (1996), Intimate Revolt (1997), Hatred and Forgiveness (2005). 
There, she connects the emptying of symbolic law to the elaboration of 
regulatory power that reduces subjects to bodies of organs, bios to zoe.8 
Engaging implicitly if not explicitly with biopolitical themes, Kristeva warns 
that the expansion of regulation produces a “life of death [...a] life for itself, 
life without questions.”9  
This paper explores three aspects of the psychic “life of death”: the 
regulatory powers of the spectacle, the mute symptoms of the patrimonial 
individual, and the resistance of intimate revolt. Through these discussions, 
I argue that Kristeva’s recent work allows us to explore something like the 
politics of life, or biopolitics. To be sure, there are tensions between 
psychoanalysis and the discourse analysis that undergirds most accounts of 
biopolitics, including the theories of Foucault and Agamben that I examine 
in these pages. For instance, while Kristeva’s recent writing emphasizes the 
multiplication and depths of disciplinary norms, she maintains that psychic 
life cannot be the object of total administration; in an important sense, zoe 
exceeds bios. This paper does not pretend to resolve as much as reflect on 
these tensions. On my reading, Kristeva’s writings on “the powers and 
limits of psychoanalysis” (1996-2005) explore two themes that are under-
theorized in the traditional literature on biopolitics, the regulation of gender 
and the meaning of life.  
The “Power Vacuum”: Regulation and the Spectacle 
In her 1996 text The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, Kristeva describes 
contemporary power as a kind of disciplinary “power vacuum”—
normalizing, falsifiable, and non-locatable.10 Where the 1980s trilogy maps the 
deforming impact of fierce yet artificial law on the preverbal child, the 
“power vacuum” connects the erosion of symbolic law to the proliferation of 
norms. Today, “in the place of the prohibition or power that cannot be 
found, disciplinary and administrative punishments multiply, repressing or 
rather normalizing everyone.”11 On this point, Kristeva draws on the writing 
of French legal theorist Mireille Delmas-Marty, whose research on 
globalization and human rights law links the “soft laws” of neoliberal 
deregulation to the expansion of normalizing power.12 Delmas-Marty writes 
of an “anarchical proliferation of norms” by which regulation continues 
“according to different, less transparent and more complex mechanisms.”13 
Diagnosing a soft symbolic law, Kristeva’s own text describes a kind of 
regulatory avalanche, a disorienting psychic trauma that leaves analysands 
suffering from a “lack of reference points.”14  
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As a falsifiable order, the power vacuum marks how the growth of 
normalizing power loosens contemporary authority. According to Kristeva, 
the reduction of law to regulation undermines agencies of power. Open to 
corruption and perversion, “there are no longer laws but measures […] 
susceptible to appeals and delays, to interpretations and falsifications.”15 
Today, legal interpretation amounts to little more than the pursuit of 
loopholes, to “finding omissions in the law that allow otherwise unlawful 
acts to be carried out within the terms of the law.”16 More than substantive 
codes, crime and transgression reflect (the empty interpretations of) 
disciplinary tactics. In the place of guilt or innocence, metrics of normality 
and abnormality, credit and debt, govern social life. As Kristeva puts it, “we 
no longer speak of culpability but of public menace; we no longer speak of 
fault (in an automobile accident, for example) but of damages. Instead of 
responsibility, there is liability […] crime cannot be found at the same time 
as prohibition.”17 Although individuals are no longer culpable, they are held 
liable by measures that normalize in indirect, re-directable and ultimately, 
non-locatable ways. Norms are disseminated in regulatory mechanisms yet 
agents of legitimation are absent or empty masquerades.   
Kristeva draws on Guy Debord’s notion of the society of the spectacle to 
discuss the non-locatable (or “invisible”) character of the power vacuum. 
Since disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms are diffuse throughout mass 
mediated culture, power cannot be located, in part, because a sea of images 
take up its operation and confirms the absence of authority on every stage, 
from celebrity judges to the incessant and ever-revising judgment of 
celebrities themselves. As Kristeva puts it, the spectacle is a pervertible, 
normalizing “media-friendly” theatre in which “people are increasingly 
excited when they think they have unearthed a guilty party, a scapegoat” 
because we live in “a so called liberal society in which there is no 
surveillance and no punishment except in these theatrically mediatized cases 
that become a sort of catharsis of the citizen’s nonexistent guilt.”18 In this 
theatre of blame and shame, power reflects and supports the multiplication 
of norms and the corruption of authority.  The spectacle does not simply 
frustrate individuals’ ability to symbolize and represent psychic trauma, it 
produces empty docile psyches unable to locate and question authority.19  
Kristeva’s interest in the disciplinary character of spectacles recalls 
Foucault’s divergent discussion in Discipline and Punish. In one of the text’s 
more polemical moments, Foucault observes: 
[s]ociety is one not of the spectacle but of surveillance. 
Under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; 
behind the great abstraction of exchange there continues 
the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces  […] it is 
not that the beautiful totality of the individual is 
amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is 
rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, 
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according to whole techniques of forces and bodies. We 
are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in 
the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic 
machine.20 
Here, Foucault describes the spectacle as the “amputating” anachronistic 
scaffold of sovereign power, suggesting that discipline operates only beyond 
its field, “under the surface of images” and “behind the abstraction of 
exchange.” Writing in a more mediated and commodifying era than 
Discipline and Punish, Kristeva’s spectacle is not identified with sovereign 
power. “According to whole techniques of forces and bodies,” the spectacle 
carefully disciplines and shapes the psyche through mass media and 
consumer culture; where “invisible” power falls short, it facilitates the 
empty resurgence of law in theatrical scapegoating. The normalizing order is 
a little more “Greek” than Foucault believes; today the amphitheatre and the 
panopticon coexist and coordinate.  
In this context, Kristeva’s claim that “there is no punishment and no 
surveillance” beyond the spectacle refers to the “so-called liberal” mode of 
the spectacle, not its borders. In fact, Foucault’s account of  liberal and 
neoliberal biopower resonates with the attitude that “anything goes.” If 
discipline “regulates everything” and “lets nothing escape,” biopower “lets 
things happen.”21 Where discipline holds that “the smallest things must not 
be abandoned to themselves,” biopower “stands back sufficiently so that one 
can grasp the point at which things are taking place.”22 With its ever-
increasing importance in daily life, the internet appears an unlimited field of 
free exploration and self-creation. Yet, “standing back sufficiently” in 
embedded advertisements and the code of search tools, ever-advancing 
technologies of user-tracking surveil and shape freedom. This genre of 
laissez-faire regulation disciplines and scapegoats the abnormal, through the 
saturation of normalizing images or the mocking circulation of viral videos. 
But it also presents and promotes an “anything goes” attitude in which 
normalization parades (and operates) as empty rebellion and fake 
autonomy. “Letting things happen” without leaving things alone, the 
“power vacuum” reflects the neo-liberal shape of the spectacle. 
In Hatred and Forgiveness, Kristeva applies her understanding of 
spectacular, normalizing, falsifiable power to the infamous photographs of 
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. Among other horrors, the photographs 
show U.S. Army officers giving the ‘thumbs up’ sign over the tortured 
bodies of Iraqi prisoners, holding bound prisoners with dog leashes, and 
smiling while mockingly posing as torture victims themselves. On her 
reading, the images document norms of behavior encouraged inside and 
outside the U.S. military; at the same time, they are opportunities to 
“theatrically scapegoat” abnormal and perverse individuals. She exclaims, 
“never before has the influence of the image over the body laid our 
sadomasochistic drives bare so lightly: the rule is for robots to have a blast, 
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film themselves, and communicate through the discharge in all 
innocence!”23 By describing them as “robots” following “the rule,” Kristeva 
suggests that abusers like Lyndie England and Charles Graner were not 
exceptions as much as average Americans, “humanoids ‘instructed’ by 
television reality shows worldwide and sites on the internet.”24 To the extent 
they are “lost sheep,” it is only because “the ‘society of the spectacle’ and the 
‘deculpabilization of transgression’ risks increasing the number of lost 
sheep.”25 Sadly, Kristeva argues that events like Abu Ghraib are inevitable 
in the power vacuum where the supportive sites of social life are tenuous or 
absent and regulation or surveillance multiplies in their place. For all of the 
attempts to scapegoat particular solidiers, the disciplinary spectacle 
confirms Susan Sontag’s comments about the Abu Ghraib images: “the 
photographs are us.”26 In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, the urgent question 
is not the scapegoating “who would do this?” but more critically, “who are 
we?” 
The Patrimonial Individual: Entrepreneur or Homo Sacer? 
Kristeva answers the question “who are we?” through her figure of 
psychic life in the power vacuum, the “patrimonial individual.” Reflecting 
the increasing “primacy of the market economy over the body,” she 
describes the patrimonial individual as “the owner of [their] genetic or 
organo-physiological patrimony."27 When economic measurement applies to 
one’s sense of oneself and to one’s body, the figure of a human being with 
rights is reduced to an owner of organs, and this in the “best case scenario.” 
As Kristeva points out, “there are countries where a person does not even 
own his own organs” or “where organs are stolen in order to be sold.” For 
the exposed patrimonial individual, “the whole question is whether my 
patrimony can be remunerated or free: whether I can enrich myself or, as an 
altruist, forgo payment in the name of humanity or whether I, as a victim, 
am disposed of it.”28 These differential courses of economization are 
reflected in the patrimonial individual’s resonance with two representatives 
of biopolitics—Foucault’s entrepreneurial man and Agamben’s homo sacer. 
The entrepreneur is Foucault’s figure of neoliberal biopower, a figure 
that treats his own life as a perpetual investment opportunity. Making an 
enterprise of himself, the entrepreneur understands and develops his 
capacities according to their service in the accumulation of wealth and 
value.29 Kristeva’s patrimonial individual highlights the exposed, embodied, 
psychic dimension of this neoliberal subject. For the patrimonial individual, 
life as enterprise is reflected in the deformation of early processes of psychic 
investment. On the successful completion of primary narcissism, the 
movement of loss, abjection and idealization should culminate in a 
redirection of psychic investment from the maternal body to language. For 
Kristeva, this redirection is the “first sublimation, which becomes intrinsic to 
the human condition”: “the investment of signs is translated by a surpassing 
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of the depression, by a jubilation […] ‘I’ do not invest the breast, ‘I’ do not 
invest mama; ‘I’ invest my own capacity to produce signs.”30 Reflecting how 
power conditions transform that which is “intrinsic to the human 
condition,” the patrimonial individual does not accomplish the “first 
sublimation.” In the power vacuum, individuals struggle to effectively 
invest drives in signs and spiral into rather than surpass depression.31 The 
patrimonial individual makes an enterprise of depression, investing drives 
in their body, making meaning only in the sense of making market value. 
According to Kristeva, this venture is a “flimsy” (precarious or risky) 
defensive relation to a normalizing but falsifiable power. In the best-case 
scenario, investment can “pay off” as privileged bodies enrich themselves 
towards better market position. In the worst-case scenario, patrimonial 
individuals are more deeply caught up in the enterprise of others, their 
patrimony remunerated, “their organs stolen in order to be sold.”  
In its potential dispossession, the patrimonial individual also resonates 
with the bare life of Agamben’s homo sacer, a figure whose life is abandoned 
to law in force without significance and whose death constitutes neither 
murder nor sacrifice. Divested from the world of signs, the life of the 
patrimonial individual is not a bios but rather, as Agamben describes bare 
life, a “bios that is only its own zoe” where zoe is, depending on its politicized 
market value, “convertible into cash.”32 Marking the disappearance of a 
human being with rights, the patrimonial individual is abandoned to a law 
that is empty but occupied by market logic. Both politicized and 
economized, the best and worst case scenarios of patrimony hinge on the 
contingency of market speculation. In the enterprise of life in which bare life 
is a way of life, “anything goes” in the sense that anything can be sold but 
not all bodies are valued and values rise and fall. Where Agamben speaks, in 
relation to bare life, of an inner solidarity between democracy and 
totalitarianism, Kristeva describes the loss (or economization) of values as a 
“new version of soft totalitarianism.” For Kristeva, “the famous loss of 
values” threatens to “destroy life after having devalued the question of its 
meaning.”33 Producing the bare life of the patrimonial individual, the power 
vacuum does not support bios— “lives to be told and written,” lives that 
bear and give meaning— as much as it manages zoe— the owners of organs 
and zoological life. It is this loss of meaning that Kristeva finds so typical 
and average about the photographs of Abu Ghraib. On her reading the 
military is a prime example of the psychic trauma of empty regulation, a 
regulation that more and more characterizes life outside the military. As 
Kelly Oliver puts it, “this is why young soldiers can follow a strict schedule, 
polish their boots, and salute their superiors—all codes of extreme 
discipline—and at the same time, torture and sexually victimize their 
prisoners and each other. […] regulations may order the lives of these 
soldiers, but they don’t provide them with robust meaning.”34 
Kristeva describes the “new version of soft totalitarianism” in general 
terms, but she emphasizes that its dangers weigh more heavily on the lives 
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and psyches of women. That is, given the sexed associations of the 
“ancestral distinction between those who give life (women) and those who 
give meaning (men),” women experience the totalitarian threat of the power 
vacuum in disproportionate ways. In so-called liberal society, political and 
cultural changes promise to support the lives of women as bearing and 
giving meaning and to help women “give meaning to the act of giving that 
is life.” However, the reversibility of these promises can be observed in the 
rise of technology and access to contraception and artificial insemination. 
Today, technology often reduces women to being merely possessors of 
zoological life; the “control of the birth rate” manages and impoverishes the 
erotics of sex and the spiritual experience of birth.35  In contexts dominated 
by the supremacy of life as a political and cultural value, the association of 
women with “those who give life” reflects and encourages the regulation of 
“wives and mothers [as] natural executors of zoology.” More closely tied to 
life itself, and more readily encountered as a body to be economized, 
marketed or managed, “those who give life” are often patrimonial women. 
Here again, the “whole question” is “whether patrimony is remunerated or 
free,” whether one is a victim or beneficiary of dispossession. Among 
patrimonial women, vulnerability to invasive control and regulation is 
unevenly distributed. For many, the economization of life sets off the 
suicidal tendency of melancholia, seeking subjective shelter in market logics 
that circulate violence. For others, the economization of life sets off the 
exclusionary tendency of abjection, rejecting and consuming bodies (or body 
parts) from the lower echelons of society. At the intimate, micropolitical 
level, these circuits of depression reflect what more typical biopolitical 
lenses observe at the level of the population: while some women’s lives are 
fostered, others are disallowed or reduced to survival.   
 To be sure, from the perspective of biopolitics, Kristeva’s approach to 
gender is not without psychoanalytic baggage. At one point in these 
discussions, she suggests that the vaginal body “imposes on woman an 
experience of the interior that does not allow it to be easily sacrificed to the 
prohibition” or molded to the norm.36 A kind of excess to the power 
vacuum, this resistant interior contributes to women’s’ disproportionate 
experience of melancholia; women’s bios are challenged not only by the 
empty nature of regulation but the vaginal body itself. Claims like these 
remind us of the persistent tensions that obtain between psychoanalysis and 
discourse analysis.37 For readers familiar with Kristeva’s early work, this 
account of the vaginal body mirrors her writings on the semiotic body that 
exceeds, while being shaped by and interrupting, the symbolic order. It is 
therefore notable that Kristeva’s account of resistance in the power vacuum 
does not mirror her early account of a semiotically driven revolution in 
poetic language. In the face of a more disseminate and normalizing power 
Kristeva argues for an intimate revolt rather than a revolutionary poetics. 
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Intimate Revolt: Repetition or Resistance? 
In the lead essay of Hatred and Forgiveness, “Thinking about Liberty in 
Dark Times,” Kristeva evokes this intimate revolt within the context of “two 
visions of freedom or liberty that all democratic societies without exception 
have elaborated.”38 The first vision is associated with Kant’s departure from 
understandings of freedom as absence from constraint. Kant’s Selbstanfang, 
self-beginning or self-starting, “opens the way for praise of the enterprising 
individual.”39 Tracing a broad lineage to neoliberal instrumentalization, 
Kristeva claims, “this kind of freedom culminates in the logic of 
globalization and the unrestrained free-market. [It adapts] to the logic of 
‘causes and effects’ that culminates in a specific way of thinking, which is 
thinking as calculus and scientific thinking.40 The second vision of freedom 
emerges in the pre-Socratic and Socratic world, that is, prior to the 
Aristotelian categories that condition scientific thought. Rather than a 
calculating subordination to a cause, the second vision of freedom is a 
process of “eternal questioning,” associated with the Being of Language 
“which delivers, gives, or presents itself to itself and to the other and 
liberates itself in the process.”41 In general, Kristeva describes the second 
vision as an act of revolt that takes place “in turning back on itself, in 
accomplishing its anamnesis, in renewing itself continually through a process 
of self-questioning.”42   
By her own admission, Kristeva oversimplifies the contrast between 
self-beginning and revolt but she does not understate their tensions. Self-
beginning dominates our contemporary vision and threatens the possibility 
of revolt. The 20th and 21st centuries saw totalitarianisms, soft or otherwise, 
“appropriate the idea of revolt only to transform it into deadly dogma.”43 
Revolutions “liberate” peoples only to squash the process of questioning; 
normalization parades as rebellion as people forget or fail to question and 
self-question.44 “All indications are that we are being carried away by the 
maelstrom of our calculus thinking and by our consumerism.”45 In contexts 
like these, Kristeva asks, “who can revolt, and against what? Can a body of 
organs revolt against a normalizing order? How? Through remote controlled 
images? If we want to talk about culture in this context, clarification is 
necessary: what culture are we talking about?”46  
Kristeva’s theory of revolt is inspired by its history and etymology. 
With origins in the Latin verb volvere, to turn or return, the French meaning 
of revolt is connected to sullying, reversal, detour, cycle, stalling, upheaval, 
recovery, reassessment among other mutations.47 Where “revolution” has 
associations via revolvere (to consult, to reread, to tell), revolt “twists and 
turns—indeed, veers off—depending on history.”48 For Kristeva, “surprise 
is never extraneous to revolt,” especially in Freud’s texts where Oedipal 
revolt plays a central role in psychic and social life. In Freud’s well-known 
fable for the origin of civilization, primitive men live in hordes where the 
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father prohibits his son’s access to women. One day, in an act of rebellion, 
the sons murder the father, replace him with the totem symbol, feast and, in 
their guilt, develop a social bond. For Freud, this murder of the father is an 
“element of filial rebelliousness” that forms the social order and that 
emerges, “in the later products of religions, often in the strangest disguises 
and transformations.”49 Part of the archaic formation of social life, Oedipal 
revolt, returns in surprising disguises, twists and turns.  
On Kristeva’s reading, the most interesting element of the Freudian 
fable is the “fruit” of the son’s crime—the appropriation of the father’s 
qualities and the social bond. The sons identify with and appropriate the 
father’s qualities—authority, law, and value. By taking his place, they 
displace authority and make it their own. Describing the “fruit” of 
authorization, Kristeva writes from the first person perspective, “‘I’ feel 
flattered to be promoted to the level of someone who could, if not be the 
father, at least acquire his qualities, identify with his power; ‘I’ was 
associated with this power; ‘I’ was not excluded.”50 Promoted to one who 
can, like the father, own authority, the sons “forge the link that will be the 
socius.”51  Through identification and authorization they earn a sense of 
inclusion, a place, in the social order. This social tie is a pleasure “subjacent” 
to the guilt of the crime; alongside bonding feelings of guilt, the sons feast 
and celebrate the fruits of revolt. Here, again, Oedipal revolt illustrates the 
surprise of revolt; displacing and assuming psychic authority, the sons’ 
revolt is an upheaval that reverses and transforms.  
Kristeva’s notion of “intimate revolt” celebrates a broader practice of 
revolt that confronts, displaces and assimilates an authority in the psychic 
economy of the individual. For the developing child, the rebellious 
incorporation of social authority is a condition for entering the symbolic 
order. In adult life, intimate revolt is a regenerative return to the past that 
questions and renews symbolic ties. In each case, revolt is a process of 
questioning and authorization by which the subject becomes an agent of 
power and meaning and accomplishes a sense of belonging in social life. 
Only through revolt can one find and make meaning; its failure marks the 
onset of the empty docile psyche and its “fruits” lie in the social belonging 
that enables the capacity to represent. Kristeva describes the rewards of 
revolt as the “singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the 
other.”52 Having shown that the psyche is a political and power laden scene, 
revolt reflects her commitment that the “transformation of man’s 
relationship to meaning […] intrinsically concerns public life and 
consequently has profoundly political implications. In fact, it poses the 
question of another politics, that of permanent conflictuality.”53  Intimate 
revolt is not revolutionary. It does not aim to “deliver us” from the political, 
nor does it imply that the “couch is expected to rise up and take power.”54   
In recognition of the depths and non-locatability of normalizing power, it is 
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a “permanent conflictuality” by which drives and affects find support in 
signifying systems.  
As an indefinite, non-punitive, questioning self-relation, intimate revolt 
bears some resemblance to Foucault’s notion of the care of the self. 
Undertaken by a reflexive subject quite unlike the confessional subject of the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality, the care of the self is a “moral practice 
of self-care not a moralized relation to the self”; it is a cultivation of one’s 
potentials, capacities, and strengths rather than a measuring of being vis-à-
vis higher ideals or hidden truths.55  To be sure, Foucault rejects the notion 
of pre- or extra-symbolic drives and tends to associate psychoanalysis with 
“spiritual” and “positivist” search for self-truths.56  Nevertheless, his 
writings on the care of the self pursue a self-truth relation that is as intimate 
as Kristeva’s revolt and that is inspired by the same Greek vision of 
freedom. For both, the reach of regulatory power in modern life means “we 
can no longer think that access to truth will complete in the subject, like a 
crowning or a reward.”57 Indeed, Kristeva is clear that revolt cannot be 
finalized. As she puts it, “the interminability, no longer inexorable but open, 
is a sort of numerical, countable infinity that will continue in the future of a 
life and generations to come.”58  Foucault distinguishes between two genres 
of truth-self relation that embrace this interminability: “the subject is capable 
of truth, such as it is, but truth cannot save the subject” and the “subject is 
not capable of the truth, but such as it is, the truth can transfigure and save 
the subject.”59 In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault embraces the first 
while associating psychoanalysis with the second, more “spiritual” relation. 
At the same time, he credits Lacan with “reintroducing into psychoanalysis 
the oldest tradition, the oldest questioning, the oldest disquiet of the 
epimeleia heautou (care of oneself).”60 What would Foucault have said of a 
disquiet that transfigures but does not save a subject?61   
Intimate Futures and the Meaning of Life 
Intimate revolt is not a form of salvation; today even its interminable 
practice is uncertain. Endless questioning is imperiled in the power vacuum 
where quiet depression is a way of life, a flimsy defensive enterprise that 
repeats without transfiguring formative traumas. Moreover, another 
destructive trajectory often overtakes revolt—the eruption of abjection in 
social life. Abjection is a revolting process in which the infans renders the 
mother’s body abject—disgusting, vomitous, revolting—in order to facilitate 
maternal separation. It is necessary part of the child’s rebellious 
development; only by abjecting the maternal body can the child begin to 
confront, displace and assimilate paternal authority.62 When authority 
cannot be located, subjects struggle to abject the maternal body. As Kristeva 
puts it, when identification with power no longer works “’I’ feel excluded” 
in a depressive mode or, in an effort to abolish the feeling of exclusion 
altogether, “‘I’ include myself at the top [and] ‘I’ exclude those at the bottom 
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[…] renewing exclusions at the lower echelons of the social edifice.”63  
Disempowered, excluded and lacking social bonds, a depressed culture 
experiences (and economizes) the symptoms a depressed individual feels in 
isolation—despair, symbolic collapse, and a severance of social ties. Subjects 
in search of a non-locatable authority or a purified social order re-invoke 
violent processes of identity differentiation against the lower echelons of 
society. In the absence of resources that give meaning “life becomes a life of 
death, a life of physical and moral violence, barbarity.”64 For Kristeva, the 
explosion of abjection is on display in the barbaric photographs of Abu 
Ghraib that portray the soldiers’ attempts to exclude in order to feel 
included. Lacking the support of substantive social bonds, the soldiers make 
“meaning” only by rejecting and victimizing others.65 Kristeva’s belief that 
the Abu Ghraib abusers are average Americans is consistent with her view 
that the future of revolt is uncertain. In Hatred and Forgiveness, she describes 
revolt as imperiled as it is urgent; at this point, it might only be an 
aspiration.  
To the extent that revolt has any future, Kristeva suggests that it lies in 
whatever social supports remain in the power vacuum, or the psychic 
capacities that lie beyond it. Throughout Kristeva’s writings, the “loving 
third” or “imaginary father” is an important figure of loving social support. 
In the process of separating from the maternal body within primary 
narcissism, the child identifies with and idealizes the “imaginary father” as 
the site of the mother’s love, an “accepting or loving third” between an 
abject mother and the stern law of the father. The loving third is a figure of 
the semiotic element of language, a “conduit that supports the transfer of 
drives and affects into signification.”66 Providing an accepting space for 
drives in language, the third promises resources to the symbolization of loss 
and abjection and thereby protects against depressive collapse or abjecting 
eruptions. Without supportive sites of transference for drives, with only 
empty laws and regulatory mechanisms, individuals in the power vacuum 
lose their sense of belonging to the social order, their openness to finding 
and making meaning.  
Although she has long celebrated aesthetic practices and sacred 
experiences as remainders of the loving third in contemporary life, more 
recently Kristeva suggests that social programs might help individuals to 
rediscover their sense of social belonging, their openness to finding and 
making meaning. As an advocate for individuals with disabilities, Kristeva 
works with organizations like UNESCO and the National Council on 
Disability to promote awareness about “people in a situation of handicap,” a 
descriptor that highlights the social context of disabilities.67 Describing her 
advocacy as an extension of her critique of soft totalitarianism, Kristeva 
navigates the twin challenges of “avoid[ing] euthanasia in the name of 
science as well as the pseudo-humanism of armoring the patient in the 
carapace of a worker.”68 An instrumental, “self-starting” response to 
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disability attempts to “build producers” rather than support social 
connections.  Inspired by revolt, Kristeva argues that task lies not in 
“integration” (or “accommodation”) but interaction, “what meaning to give 
the limits of life—birth, death, deficiencies? […] Will advanced democracies 
have the means to support life with its limits and shortcomings, soliciting 
and favoring the subject within them?”69 Although Kristeva does not 
identify particular disability programs that support revolt, she does call for a 
fourth term to be added to the French motto, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 
and…Vulnerability.” Kristeva envisions interactions that share singular 
vulnerabilities, and support the most fragile aspects of ourselves. In a 
hopeful moment, she asks “what if this were the private [intimate] face of 
the politics of disability?”70 
 Kristeva is most hopeful about the future of revolt when she discusses 
those psychic dimensions that lie beyond the power vacuum. For instance, 
she claims that the vaginal body gives women an “experience of the 
interior” that resists regulation. As mentioned above, this resistance is 
reflected in women’s disproportiate experience of depression, but it also 
manifests as a special capacity for revolt.  According to Kristeva, “whether 
mistress or mother, a woman remains a stranger to the sacrifice: she 
participates in it, she assumes it, but she disrupts it, she can also threaten it. 
It is therefore understandable how a vital depth also constitutes a social 
danger.”71 The particular “social danger” envisaged is the upheaval of a 
revolt that reconnects life and meaning, refiguring the “ancestral distinction 
between those who give life (women) and those who give meaning (men).”72  
A “stranger” to law and regulation, woman suffers from the lack of form-
giving social bonds in such a way that she is poised to find and form them 
anew, beyond the sexist arrangements that associate women with “giving 
life” and men with “giving meaning.” 
 In biopolitical terms, Kristeva’s account of the vaginal body is 
regulatory. While she celebrates the disappearance of sexist distinctions, this 
understanding of the vaginal body maintains a distinction between zoe and 
bios, producing and surveilling the borders of “life itself.” Here, Kristeva’s 
text is in tension with itself as much as any biopolitical lens. On the one 
hand, Kristeva critiques the violence of a normalizing power that produces 
individuals, in differential and differentiating ways, as depressive 
enterprising patrimonial men and women that struggle to speak. On the 
other hand, she tends to link women and zoe to an excess materiality beyond 
the reach of empty laws and the movements of normalizing power. On the 
one hand, “life itself, life without questions” is a production of the power 
vacuum. On the other hand, there is zoe, an excess pure and resistant 
materiality that precedes and exceeds subjection, the “generally biological 
aspect of life: which would be as it were ‘programmed’ […] by genetic 
destiny.”73 From a biopolitical perspective, every appeal to a pre- or extra- 
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symbolic life participates in the regulation of women’s lives, more than its 
theorization.  
 Any attempt to carry forward the thought of the “psychic life of 
biopolitics” will require critical reflection on the meaning of (psychic) life. 
This is a reflection that can benefit common and uncommon approaches to 
biopolitics. In Foucault’s texts as well as Agamben’s, there is a remarkable 
ambiguity about the meaning of life and equivocation about life’s openness 
to total administration. In one under-theorized moment of The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault says that life “constantly escapes or exceeds the 
techniques that govern and administer it.”74 While Agamben claims that zoe 
and bios are always already indistinct in the form of bare life, his theory 
relies on an understanding of what these terms mean in their distinction. 
Kristeva’s underappreciated engagements with the theme of biopolitics—the 
power vacuum, the patrimonial individual, intimate revolt—can spur this 
productive query. On her view, we must revalue the question of life’s 
meaning in order to resist the destructive forces of the power vacuum, and 
to support the melancholic psyches of Isabel and Helen, Lyndie England and 
Charles Graner.  
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